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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: OBSERVATIONS ON THE EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
David A. Westbrook*
I. INTRODUCTION
The environment is not mentioned in the original texts of any
of the Treaties creating the European Communities ("EC").I None-
theless, in the 1970's, the EC began to grapple with environmental
problems. 2 In 1985, the Single European Act established the pro-
tection of the environment as one of the EC's six most important
obligations. 3 Even after the passage of the Single European Act,
the implementation of environmental policy was fitful and increas-
ingly the object of widespread and intense criticism. On November
28, 1989, the environmental ministers of the EC states agreed to
create a semi-autonomous institution at Community level to deal
* Harvard Law School, Class of 1992.
1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The EEC Treaty has been amended in essential
ways by the Single European Act. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987). This Note
uses "EC," even though the more prevalent Anglo-American usage is "EEC." While the
mechanisms for Community action are usually described as economic, the actions of the
EC often reflect more complex motives and goals. The European Communities-Coal and
Steel, Atomic, and Economic-were conceived in order to prevent war, that is, to transform
the nature of European politics. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169. The EEC treaty expressly contains
policy which cannot be considered "economic" in any meaningful sense, most explicitly in
part 3, title III, "Social Policy." For an analogous use of language, a U.S. lawyer might
recall the range of laws constitutionally justified under the commerce clause. Moreover,
central institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic
Energy Community, and the European Economic Community were fused by the Treaty
Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities
(Merger Treaty), 10 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 152) 1 (1967). Thus, as a technical matter, these
Community institutions are not founded solely upon the EEC Treaty, even though most of
their activities are conducted under the authority of the EEC Treaty. In these circum-
stances, to indicate that Community politics is "economic," and by implication somewhat
removed from other societal questions, would be misleading.
2. Haagsma, The European Community's Environmental Policy: A Case Study in
Federalism, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 311, 315 (1989).
3. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, pt. 3, "Policy of the Community," tit. VII,
"Environment."
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with environmental policy.4 A Council Regulation of May 7, 1990,
formally established the European Environment Agency
("EEA").5 Although the Regulation has been promulgated, it will
not take effect until a site for the EEA is chosen.6 This Note
describes the proposed agency, reviews the criticisms which the
proposal has received, and discusses ways in which the EEA might
be realized.
The Regulation is structured around the Council's recognition
of an unmet need for scientific information as a prerequisite for
sound environmental policy. The Regulation states:
[C]ollection, processing, and analysis of environmental data at
European level are necessary in order to provide the Commu-
nity and the Member States with objective, reliable, and com-
parable information which will enable them to take the requisite
measures to protect the environment, to assess the results of
such measures and to ensure that the public is properly in-
formed about the state of the environment. 7
The Regulation establishes the EEA, and "aims at the setting
up of a European environment information and observation
network."8 The activities of this network "would be coor-
dinated at Community level by a European Environment
Agency."9
On its face, the Regulation establishes the EEA as an infor-
mation-gathering, not a regulatory, body. To achieve this goal,
article 2 of the Regulation enumerates ten specific tasks for the
EEA: (1) to establish and coordinate an environmental network,
comprised of national environmental institutions, national "focal
points," and "topic centres;"' 0 to this end, Member States will
4. Environment Ministers Agree On Plan To Set Up a European Environment
Agency, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 579, 579 (1989). The press often refers to this Agency
as the European Environmental Agency, which sounds more familiar to American environ-
mentalists. I have followed the usage of the Council Regulation, infra note 5.
5. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1210/90 of May 7, 1990, on the establishment of
the European Environment Agency and the European environment information and obser-
vation network, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 120) 1 (1990) [hereinafter Regulation].
6. Id. art. 21; see infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
7. Regulation, supra note 5, preamble, para. 9; see also id. art. 1, para. 2.
8. Id. art. 1, para. 1.
9. Id. preamble, para. 11.
10. Id. art. 2(i); art. 4, para. 1. In addition, "Member States may designate an
institution as 'a national focal point' for coordinating and/or transmitting the information
to be supplied at national level .... Id. art. 4, para. 3. Under paragraph 4 of the same
article:
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"inform the EEA of the main component elements of their national
environment information networks.. .";11 (2) to provide the Com-
mission and the Member States with objective information for the
purpose of framing sound policy; (3) to record, collate and assess
data to be used by the Commission "in its task of ensuring the
implementation of Community legislation on the environment;"
(4) to harmonize methods of measurement; (5) to incorporate Eu-
ropean data into international environment monitoring programs;
(6) to disseminate information, and to publish a triennial report on
the state of the environment; (7) to promote research in the "de-
velopment and application of environmental forecasting tech-
niques;" (8) to promote research into techniques for assessing
environmental costs; (9) to facilitate the exchange of information
on environmental damage control technologies; and (10) to coop-
erate with various European and global organizations.12
The scale of the EEA is modest, and its structure is relatively
simple. The Agency is an institution distinct from the Commission
and other Community bodies. In the words of the Regulation, the
Agency is a legal person, and enjoys "in all the Member States
the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under
their laws."'" The Agency's sixteen-member management board
includes a representative of each Member State, two representa-
tives of the Commission, and two scientists chosen by the Euro-
pean Parliament on the basis of their likely contribution to the
work of the Agency.' 4 The board adopts its own internal
procedures1 5 and elects a chair from among its members to a three-
year term. 16 Most board decisions must be passed by a two-thirds
majority.' 7
Member States may also identify the institutions.., which could be specifically
entrusted with the task of cooperating with the Agency as regards certain
topics of particular interest. An institution thus identified should be in a position
to conclude an agreement with the Agency to act as a topic centre of the
network for specific tasks in a precise geographical area.
Id. art. 4, para. 4.
11. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
12. Id. art. 2, paras. 1-10.
13. Id. art. 7.
14. Id. art. 8, para. 1.
15. Id. art. 8, para. 2.
16. Id.
17. Id. art. 8, para. 3. The exception is the designation of the topic centers. See id.
art. 4, para. 5.
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An Executive Director, nominated by the Commission and
appointed by the Board to a five-year term, runs the daily affairs
of the EEA with the assistance of a scientific committee, 8 whose
nine members are designated by the management board for a term
of four years.' 9 The Executive Director submits the EEA budget
to the Board, which in turn gives it to the Commission for inclusion
in the general budget of the European Community. 20
The Regulation states that it "shall be binding in its entirety
and directly applicable in all Member States. '' 21 While the Regu-
lation will establish the EEA throughout the Community without
further implementation by the Member States, the Regulation will
not take effect until a site for the Agency is chosen. 22 To date,
every EC State except Luxembourg has made a bid for the EEA. 23
II. THE EEA IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN POLITICS
The relationship between the EEA and other political entities
which operate within the Community-Member States, other EC
organs, and international institutions not founded on Community
documents-remains unresolved. The French government gave
the EEA much of its early impetus,24 and responding in part to
Europeans' growing environmental concerns, the other Member
States have all voiced some support for a European Environment
18. Id. art. 9.
19. Id. art. 10.
20. Id. art. 12.
21. Id. at Regulation final sentence. See EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 189. The
doctrine of direct effect has generated considerable literature. Certain Community actions
create legally enforceable rights and obligations irrespective of Member State implemen-
tation. The landmark case is Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administrie der Belastingen,
Case 26/62, 1963 EUR. CT. REP. 1. For an influential discussion, see Pescatore, The Doctrine
of "Direct Effect:" An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REv. 155 (1983). For
a brief overview of Community law and environmental policy, see Haigh, The Environ.
mental Policy of the European Community and 1992, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 617 (1989).
22. Regulation, supra note 5, art. 21.
23. Meade, Government Embarassed over EC Agency Bid Objections, PREss ASS'N
NEWSFILE, Jan. 25, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file). The debate over the EEA's
location has been linked to the siting of various other Community institutions, including
the proposed European Development Bank. See Environment Ministers Set Up Agency
But Site Location Remains Uncertain, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 144, 144 (1990). Although
the debate has been conducted with high feeling, as of this writing no agreement has been
reached. See 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 3-386) 117 (1990) (Debates of the European
Parliament).
24. Dickson, EC To Step Up Plans For New Green Agency, Fin. Times (London),
May 8, 1989, at 4.
260
European Environment Agency
Agency. 25 Despite the general assent to the idea of the EEA,
Member States differ in the depth of their support, reflecting their
varied positions on the amount of power which the EEA should
be granted. 26
Although Member States adopt varying positions at the Coun-
cil level, it would be wrong to think of the debates over the EEA
as structured primarily by national interests. Representation in the
Council of Ministers is by nation, and is literally the representation
of the administration of Member State governments, that is, the
national interest as construed by the ruling party. In contrast to
the inherently nationalistic tenor of Council discussion, the recent
plethora of conferences on the European environment generally
has been multinational in scope. In addition, it often has been
informed by sectoral concerns, for example, those of lawyers and
of the chemical industry. The European Parliament, where politics
is based on party color rather than national alliance, hotly debated
the EEA, and in the process further demonstrated the insufficiency
of a "national interest" analysis of the environmental debate. 27
Nonetheless, any environmental policies instituted at Community
level will impinge on the domestic legislation of Member States.
Consequently, a sensitivity to the tension between the Member
States and the Community is required. At present, the Agency has
little legal power of its own-that is, it has no direct power to
compel action by Member States. 28
The relationship between the EEA and other Community in-
stitutions is similarly complex. Jacques Delors, President of the
European Commission, called for a pan-European environmental
agency in his keynote address to the European Parliament on
January 17, 1989.29 While agreeing on the need for an environ-
25. For a political overview of the greening of Europe, see Grapin, The Storming of
Strasbourg; Europe Gets Greener, WORLDPAPER, Nov. 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni
file).
26. Great Britain, for instance, has voiced considerably less support for the EEA.
See Green Policing, The Times (London), May 16, 1990, at 13 (editorial); see also infra
notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 3-386) 112-13 (1990) (Debates of the Euro-
pean Parliament). See also Aldred, Cost of Europe's "Green" Wave Unclear, Bus. INs.,
May 14, 1990, at 35; infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
28. The fact that the EEA does not possess legal powers is not to be confused with
the fact that the Regulation gives the EEA legal personality. Regulation, supra note 5, art.
7. To further complicate matters, while the EEA does not have the power to coerce, it
does have legal powers, such as the ability to contract and to indemnify. See id. art. 18.
29. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 2-373) 73 (1989) (Debates of the European Parliament).
1991]
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mental agency, the Commission and the Parliament have since
disagreed over its scope.30 The Parliament would like a regulatory
agency, while the Commission maintains that it cannot delegate
regulatory powers and that environmental regulations will continue
to be promulgated through existing institutional vehicles.3
Article 15 of the Regulation mandates cooperation between
the EEA and other international institutions concerned with the
environment, particularly the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme ("UNEP"). 32 The EC is currently party to approximately
thirty international agreements on the environment, and it is ne-
gotiating more. 33 Presumably, the EEA will have a role in contin-
ued cooperation under existing agreements and will figure promi-
nently in whatever new accords are reached.
Looking beyond cooperation, German Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher has proposed a pan-European environmental
agency as part of a new security system for Europe based on a
geometric expansion of the Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe ("CSCE"):
The aim is a bold design for the future of Europe as a whole.
The only element binding the role of Europe at present is the
CSCE process. That process must become a framework of
stability for the dynamic, traumatic, and in some cases, revo-
lutionary developments in Central and Eastern Europe, includ-
ing the Soviet Union .... What institutions can be established
in the CSCE process?.., a European environmental agency. 34
The EEA also has considerable support outside the Community.
At an environmental conference in Bergen, then Norwegian Prime
Delors stated: "[the Commission will propose the introduction of a European system of
environmental measurement and verification which could be the precursor of a European
environment agency." Id.
30. Euro-Parliament Threatens to Torpedo Environment Agency, Reuters, Feb. 14,
1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
31. 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 3-386) 113-14 (1990) (Debates of the European Parlia-
ment). However, Delors has suggested that the EEA be placed under the European Parlia-
ment and given enforcement powers. Delors Seeks European Environment Agency, With
Inspectors, But Timetable In Question, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 287, 287 (1989).
32. Regulation, supra note 5, art. 15.
33. Grapin, supra note 25. The participation of both the EC and the Member States
in international environmental accords, for example the Montreal Protocol, has largely
unexplored ramifications for international law.
34. Speech of West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher to the Amer-
ican Society of Newspaper Editors Convention (Apr. 6, 1990), quoted in Fed. News Serv.,
Apr. 6, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file). CSCE includes the United States, Canada,
and all the nations of Europe except Albania.
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Minister Jan Syse made proposals similar to Genscher's for the
involvement of European Free Trade Association ("EFTA") na-
tions, as well as the Soviet Union and East Europe, in a European
environmental agency with extensive regulatory powers.35 While
the Council Regulation is silent on EEA participation by non-
Member States, the Commission proposal for the EEA was never
restricted to the European Community. When the Commission first
published detailed plans for the EEA, European Community En-
vironment Commissioner Ripa di Meana announced that the EFTA
states and several East European states had expressed an interest
in participation. 6 Since then, the Vienna Conference on the en-
vironment, attended by representatives of virtually all European
states, including the East European states and the USSR, con-
cluded with a call for the creation of a pan-European environmen-
tal agency that would establish uniform standards for pollution
control and would monitor compliance.3 7
III. CRITICISMS OF THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
A. Inappropriate Use of Community Resources
Four basic criticisms have been leveled against the EEA.
Former British Environment Minister Lord Caithness has argued
that the EEA will be expensive and will duplicate work done by
other agencies, so that it is a waste of Community resources.
38
After a meeting of EC Member States' environmental ministers,
Caithness framed the issue as "whether the job can be done with
existing institutions or whether you really need to create a new
agency.'3
9
These concerns are unfounded. The EEA is a small organi-
zation, in terms of the geographic area, population, and environ-
35. Green Policing, supra note 26, at 13. The EFTA countries are Finland, Sweden,
Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Austria.
36. The Commission stated that the proposed Agency would "help the Community,
Member States, and third countries attain high standards of environmental protection."
Commission Proposes Protection Agency Open to East, West European Countries, 12 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 338, 338 (1989).
37. European Lawmakers Urge Greater Cooperation on Environment, United Press
Int'l, Oct. 25, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
38. Dickson, supra note 24, at 4.
39. Id.
19911
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mental degradation within its purview, so it is difficult to see the
Agency as expensive. The claim that the tasks of the EEA are
already being fulfilled by other organizations, i.e., that good data
exists for the European environment, is unsubstantiated.40
B. Inappropriate Interference with Member State Sovereignty
At the Action for a Common Future conference hosted by the
Norwegian government in Bergen ("Bergen II"), the United King-
dom forthrightly opposed what it perceived as another intrusion
of the EC into the regulatory activities of Member States. 41 Al-
though less vociferously, Spain has adopted a similar position. 42
In light of these concerns, the Commission's proposal was modi-
fied to give the EEA a less interventionist role.
C. As Proposed, EEA Resources Are Inadequate to Its Task
Conversely, the European Parliament threw out the proposed
EEA on the grounds that it had no powers to set standards, to
40. Clover, Technology: Is Britain Really the Dirty Man of Europe?, Daily Telegraph
(London), June 19, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file). Clover states:
Even to attempt to identify the dirtiest nations in Europe is to discover how
elusive is accurate, up-to-date or comparable information. Could there not be
an advantage, one wonders, for Europe's politicians to keep matters that way?
... The disgraceful lack of up-to-date European environmental information is
at last beginning to be taken seriously by the European Commission.
Id.
41. Green Policing, supra note 26, at 13 (stating that "[tihe idea of international
.green policing,' which is at the heart of the plan, has received a dusty response from Mr.
David Trippier, the British minister present at Bergen.").
42. Euro-Parliament Threatens to Torpedo Environment Agency, supra note 30.
British worries over enforcement at the Community level have been aggravated by the
long-running controversy over British failure to implement water purity directives. After
lengthy negotiations failed, the Commission filed suit in the European Court of Justice. See
British Violations of EC Directive on Drinking Water Results in Legal Action, 12 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 480, 480 (1990). In a parallel action, Friends of the Earth has also sued-in
domestic courts-to force implementation of the Directive. This is the first time that English
courts have allowed an activist group to maintain such a class action, and as such represents
a case of procedural importance for the development of environmental litigation in the
United Kingdom. See Greens Allowed to Sue Government for Violation of Drinking Water
Directive, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 11, 12 (1990). Given the emotive nature of drinking
water purity, both suits have caused the government considerable embarassment, and they
have presumably heightened the sensitivity of the British government to Community level
regulation.
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monitor performance, or to compel compliance; in other words, it
was insufficiently interventionist. 43 Reflecting this sentiment,
Beate Weber, a Social Democrat from West Germany, stated: "We
have inspectors to police competition policy in the Community so
why can't we have inspectors of the environment?" 44 Responding
to such positions, and his own sympathies for a European regu-
latory agency notwithstanding, Commissioner for the Environment
Ripa di Meana called for caution: "[T]here may still be some who
will say 'We could have moved more quickly'. . . [but] the entire
history of the Community shows that the only way to make prog-
ress is by a gradual approach, in stages. '45 After heated debate,
the Parliament referred the remaining difficulties back to the Com-
mittee on the Environment, Public Health, and Consumer
Protection. 46
D. The Community's Politics Are Inherently Anti-Environmental
While the European Environmental Bureau, a lobbying group
based in Brussels, also criticizes the fact that the EEA's "functions
43. 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 3-386) 76 (1990) (Debates of the European Parliament).
44. Euro-Parliament Threatens to Torpedo Environment Agency, supra note 30.
Speaking to the European Parliament on behalf of the Committee on the Environment,
Public Health, and Consumer Protection, Weber said: "[W]e must criticize the Commis-
sion's concept, as set out in this proposal, for its inadequacy .... We need an environmental
inspectorate." 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 3-386) 75 (1990) (Debates of the European
Parliament).
45. 33 0.1. EuR. COMM. (No. 3-386) 112-13 (1990) (Debates of the European Parlia-
ment). Di Meana himself supports regulation at Community level, but does not believe that
this is the political moment for such an expansion of Community competence. In his plea
to the Parliament, di Meana said: "Sinking the agency today by insisting on doing everything
and at once means ignoring the hopes reposed in it by public opinion in the Member States,
and puts its future creation in question." Id. at 112.
46. 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 3-386) 150-51 (1990) (Debates of the European Parlia-
ment). Despite changes wrought by the Single European Act, the Parliament remains
primarily an advisory body. See Single European Act, supra note 1. While the Treaty
mandates that the Commission and Council seek parliamentary opinion on a wide variety
of activities, express parliamentary approval is not legally required for any Community
action except the budget. Nonetheless, the Commission is somewhat politically constrained
by the opinion of the Parliament, even though the Parliament plays only an advisory
function. In this case, the Commission responded to the European Parliament in a number
of ways. The original proposal was amended so that the EEA will be examined two years
after its inception, with a view to expanding its mandate. Regulation, supra note 5, art. 20.
In addition, the European Parliament is allowed to appoint two scientists to the EEA board.
Id. art. 8.
Should these changes to the EEA prove insufficient, the Parliament may block the
budget of the EEA, but this is unlikely. See Environment Ministers Set Up Agency But
Site Location Remains Uncertain, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 144, 144 (1990).
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are strictly confined to the collection and dissemination of envi-
ronmental information," 47 its critique is based on a more funda-
mental disagreement. The creation of a single market in Europe is
designed to generate enormous economic growth. Directorate Gen-
eral XI ("DG XI") of the European Community, the Commission
subdivision responsible for environmental policy, acknowledges
that the economies of scale that collectively form the single mar-
ket's most persuasive raison d'etre will further burden the Euro-
pean environment. 48 According to DG XI, no policy to meet this
increased burden will be coordinated at Community level. Instead,
the Community will continue to set minimum standards, which
will be implemented by the Member States. 49
In general, a scheme of regulation structured around minimum
standards may create a "regulatory ceiling," which prevents the
attainment of the policy objectives that the regulation was designed
to achieve. Minimum standards give Member States no incentive
to require performance higher than that required by other States,
since compliance with higher standards is expensive and puts cit-
izens at a competitive disadvantage vis-ik-vis their neighbors. 0
Moreover, since the EEA has been established as a passive, non-
regulatory institution, Member State compliance will not even
reach the "ceiling" set by the Community.5' Finally, should a
47. Dickson, Environment Threatened by Single Market, Fin. Times (London), Aug.
31, 1989, at 2.
48. See No Uniform Environmental Policy Will Exist After 1992, Official Says, 13
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 417, 417 (Oct. 10, 1990).
49. Id. Under EEC Treaty articles 130t and 100a, Member States may set standards
above those set by the EC, provided the higher standards do not conflict with the Treaty.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 130t, 100a. Actions taken by Member States which tend
to segregate the EC and thus impede progress toward the single market have often been
ruled incompatible with obligations imposed by the Treaty, even where those actions are
motivated by legitimate governmental ends. Nonetheless, the EEC Treaty as well as the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice permit a more proactive policy regarding
environmental regulation, even at the cost of a certain anticompetitive effect. See Com-
mission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Denmark, Case 302/86, 1988 EuR.
CT. REP. 4607 ("Danish Bottle") (placing the environment among the factors established
by Rewe-Zentral A.G. v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, Case 120/78, 1979
EuR. CT. REP. 649 ("Cassis de Dion"), and its progeny, which justify derogation from
EEC Treaty article 30, in addition to the express derogations created by EEC Treaty article
36).
50. Nonetheless, Member States have occasionally set standards higher than those
demanded by the Community. See, e.g., Danish Bottle, Case 302/86, 1988 EuR. CT. REP.
4607. Note that regulation is used generally in this paragraph, meaning the implementation
of policy and not the legislative device established by EEC Treaty article 189.
51. This has traditionally been a problem. "[I]nsufficient regulatory pressures by the
EC Council of Environmental Ministers has led Member States to ignore some directives
European Environment Agency
Member State choose to set a standard above the de facto mini-
mum set by the Community, the Member State conceivably might
be vulnerable to legal attack in the European Court of Justice due
to the anti-competitive effects created by the standard.5 2
These arguments reflect the traditional view of environmental
management, which presumes an adversarial relationship between
the regulator and actors in the marketplace. This orthodoxy, how-
ever, has been challenged. In first proposing the EEA, Jacques
Delors linked the Commission's environmental policy to the pro-
gram that had been sketched out by the Brundtland Report for
The World Commission on Environment and Development.5 3 The
Brundtland Report is the most politically influential statement of
the contemporary vision of environmental regulation, in which the
(natural) environment and the (human) economy are seen as es-
sentially coterminous recursive systems-systems which are dis-
tinguished for analytic purposes only.5 4
IV. POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLES FOR THE EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
A. Changes Contemplated by the Regulation
Under the impetus of so much debate, the EEA will almost
certainly become something quite different from the institution
formally established by the Regulation. On its face, the Regulation
calls for review "after two years, with a view to deciding on further
tasks for the Agency. '55 Article 20 lists three areas which the
Council, after consultation with the Commission and the Parlia-
ment, should particularly consider. First, the agency might be
made responsible for the "monitoring of the implementation of
or treat them as guidelines." Smith, EC Toughens Pollution Regulations, Bus. INS., Mar.
5, 1990, at 21.
52. Given current interpretations of the EEC Treaty, especially article 100a(4), this
risk is very small. See supra notes 1 & 49.
53. THE WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEy., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987). Gro
Brundtland, former Prime Minister of Norway, chairs the Commission.
54. Whether or not the contemporary vision will be successful, or merely palliates
environmentalists confronted with politically intractable forces such as multinational cor-
porations, developing nations, and bourgeois appetites, remains to be seen. I do not here
suggest cynicism; I pose a merely analytic, not a political, possibility.
55. Regulation, supra note 5, preamble, para. 16.
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Community environmental legislation." 56 Second, the EEA might
influence market signals through a program of labelling "environ-
mentally friendly products, technologies, goods, services and pro-
grammes which do not waste natural resources. ' 57 The Regulation
further suggests promotion of the use and transfer of environmen-
tally friendly technologies and processes, both inside and outside
the Community.5 Finally, the Regulation considers that the EEA
might undertake the establishment of environmental impact crite-
ria, with a view to the application and/or revision of Directive 85/
337/EEC, which obligates Member States to require environmental
impact assessments of public and private construction projects
and other "interventions in the natural surroundings."5 9
B. The European Environment Agency as Regulatory Body
The proposals expressly contemplated by the Regulation only
allude to the real question concerning the EEA: To what extent,
if any, will the EEA regulate? From the beginning, the press has
speculated. "As initially planned, the agency would not have en-
forcement powers." 6 Almost a year before the Council promul-
gated the Regulation, the Commission's EEA proposal was de-
scribed as "to some extent modelled on the U.S.'s powerful
Environmental Protection Agency."'61
56. Id. art. 20. Much Community legislation takes place through directives. A direc-
tive is produced by the Commission, passed by the Council of Ministers, usually after
consultation with the European Parliament, and is then implemented through the legislative
processes of the Member States. Whether or not a Member State has in fact implemented
a directive is frequently disputed, hence the suggestion that the EEA monitor implemen-
tation. See Haigh, supra note 21, at 617.
57. Regulation, supra note 5, art. 20.
58. Id. The Regulation does not define any of these terms. Most obviously, the
Regulation is silent on the extent to which "regulatory" activities will be allowed to distort
the free market.
59. Directive 85/337/EEC, art. 2, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 175) 40 (1985).
The "Corine" program was established in 1985 by Decision 85/338/EEC, 28 O.J. ER.
COMM. (No. L 176) 14 (1985). Corine is "an experimental project forgathering, co-ordinating
and ensuring the consistency of information on the state of the environment and natural
resources in the Community." Id. In June, 1990, a Council Decision extended the life and
increased the budget of the Corine program, "pending the envisaged integration of Corine
and the European Environment Agency .... 33 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 81) 38 (1990).
60. EC Summit Continues Moves Toward Economic Unity, 1989 FAcTs ON FILE 934,
934 (Dec. 15, 1989) (emphasis added).
61. Dickson, The Surprising Greening of Mr. Ripa di Meana, Fin. Times (London),
May 6/7, 1989, at 7.
European Environment Agency
The curiosity of the press is the anxiety of industry. Speaking
at a Risk and Insurance Management Society Conference, one
analyst noted that "concerns have been expressed by some in
industry that such a system will inevitably become a vehicle for
international enforcement." 62 Another remarked that some "be-
lieve that the creation of a benign data-gathering agency is merely
the first step on the road toward an environmental enforcement
role for the Community. '63
These comments, along with the criticisms and proposals men-
tioned above, presume a bifurcation between regulation and data-
gathering. Both proponents and foes of regulation feel it is more
active and more intrusive than the current EEA. Data-gathering is
seen as passive, to some extent a "scientific" attempt to gauge the
state of environmental damage in Europe, rather than a "political"
attempt to deal with it. The popular debate has been whether the
EEA represents a failure on the part of the EC to confront the
ecological crisis, or demonstrates deference to the Member States
and the market as more appropriate vehicles of popular
sovereignty.
But the bifurcation between regulation and data-gathering may
be unwarranted. One way to regulate an activity is for the regulator
to require the production of information surrounding the proposed
activity. Nominally passive data collection inhibits activities in
two basic ways. First, the regulator's review of the information
and the decisions surrounding a proposal may reveal that, on
balance, the activity is not socially desirable. The regulating
agency, or other forces, may then be used in order to prevent
execution of the proposal. Second, the production of adequate
data and reasoning imposes a considerable cost on the would-be
actor. In itself, this cost can act as a deterrent to environmentally
questionable activities. This is one of the principal ways in which
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulates, most ob-
viously when it requires an Environmental Impact Statement. 64
Article 20 of the Regulation already proposes "monitoring the
62. Aldred, supra note 27, at 35 (quoting Michael J. Murphy, analyst at Environ-
mental Strategies Corp., Vienna, Virginia).
63. Id. at 35-36 (statement of Stephen Tupper, attorney with Stanbrook & Hooper,
Brussels) (emphasis added).
64. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4361 (1988). NEPA is implemented by the Council on Environmental Quality, see 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1500-1517 (1990).
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implementation of Community environmental legislation."6 "Mon-
itoring" might be conducted through fairly restrictive data collec-
tion; producers might be required to go through complex, time
consuming, and expensive procedures in order to demonstrate
compliance with environmental legislation.
Two facially independent developments lend support to the
thesis that the Community will regulate the environment through
the provision of information. First, on March 22, 1990, the EC
environmental ministers agreed on a Freedom of Information Di-
rective providing public access to environmental information. 66
Like the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, 67 the Directive will
give citizens the right to information possessed by public bodies,
including information about the activities of private firms. Access
to information may encourage regulatory lawsuits which may be
a necessary vehicle to improve compliance. Laurens Jan Brink-
horst, who heads DG XI, the directorate for the environment,
believes the jurisgenerative aspects of the Freedom of Information
Directive provide a necessary vehicle to improve compliance. 68
The European Environment Bureau, however, argues that the Di-
rective does not go far enough and is "clearly inferior to the U.S.
Freedom of Information Act." 69
Second, the Community has proposed strict liability for toxic
wastes. 70 The Single European Act made strict liability for envi-
ronmental harms part of the EEC Treaty, stating that "action taken
by the Community relating to the environment shall be based on
the principle[s] ... that the polluter should pay. ' 71 The proposed
directive creates liabilities similar to U.S. principles of joint and
65. Regulation, supra note 5, art. 20.
66. 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 158) 56-58 (1990).
67. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
68. Role of European Environmental Agency Will Be in Data Collecting and Moni-
toring, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 477, 478 (1989). Brinkhorst has also commented that the
United States can "do much to teach Europe about access to information." Brinkhorst Sees
Environmental Agency, Biotechnology Draft as Near-Term Priorities, 12 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 388, 388 (1990). Others feel that "[elasy access to government-held information will
make the incidence of third-party damage actions more likely. As a result, businesses will
have to consider strongly whether or not their waste management systems and environ-
mental compliance programs can be improved to avoid exposing themselves to increased
liabilities." Aldred, supra note 27, at 35 (quoting Stephen Tupper, attorney with Stanbrook
& Hooper, Brussels).
69. Ministers Accept New Rules Guaranteeing Access to Environmental Informa-
tion, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 143, 144 (1990).
70. See Smith, supra note 51, at 21.
71. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 130r, para. 2.
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several liability-the producer may be liable even if not in control
of the waste at the time the harm was done. Not surprisingly, the
chemical industry opposes the directive. 72 In response to this po-
sition, Brinkhorst said he "hope[s] the American chemical com-
panies will provide some wisdom to their European counterparts,"
and that the European industry will gracefully accept DG XI's
position.73
While control of the information flow will in all likelihood be
a tool of the EEA, the Agency might also regulate along more
orthodox lines, by mandating certain levels of compliance and then
policing behavior. The London Times has argued that "Green po-
lice could be as useful, and come to seem as natural a form of
cooperation, as Interpol." 74 Any such direct regulation, however,
must overcome two systemic obstacles. Like virtually all Com-
munity actions, direct regulation by the EEA would entail enor-
mous political battles over sovereignty. More generally, direct
regulation has fallen increasingly out of vogue, largely replaced by
more market-oriented (incentive) approaches to social organiza-
tion.75 Even a market-based regulatory regime, presumptively
more efficient than traditional command-and-control approaches
to regulation, would require a vastly expanded role for the EEA.
76
72. Rheinhard Quick, European Chemical Industry Federation ("CEFIC") legal af-
fairs director, said: "We reject [the liabilty directive) because liability should be linked to
operational control." Mackerron & Chynoweth, Europe's CPI Plays Catch-Up in Environ-
mental Cleanup, CHEMICAL WEEK, Mar. 7, 1990, at 24, 27. See also European Chemical
Industry Says EEC Draft Misinterprets Principle of "Polluter Pays," 13 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 236, 236 (1990).
73. Mackerron & Chynoweth, supra note 72, at 27.
74. Green Policing, supra note 26, at 13.
75. As used in this paragraph, regulation means proactive policy management, not
the legislative device established by EEC Treaty article 189. A serious discussion of
regulatory theory is beyond the scope of this Note. As elsewhere, it is currently fashionable
in the Community to conduct policy through, rather than against, the market. See also EC
Official Says Fiscal Instruments to See Greater Use for Pollution Control, 13 Int'l Env't
Rep. 151, 151-52 (1990).
76. The Regulation states that the Agency will "make good any damage caused by
the Agency." Regulation, supra note 5, art. 18. This indemnification will take place "in
accordance with the general principles in common to the laws of the Member States." Id.
Although this phrase is a recitation of EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 215, its familiarity
does not make it less open to question. Under current conditions, more than half of Member
State environmental legislation results from Community initiatives. Grapin, supra note 25.
Moreover, the decisions of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") are certainly law common
to the Member States. A radical interpretation of the law common to Europe would be that
indemnification will take place in accordance with the jurisprudence of the ECJ. One can
imagine a regime in which the EEA closes factories, and then pays the damages, shifting
the loss to the Community as a whole, as determined in a proceeding before the ECJ, or
conceivably, as determined by the Court of First Instance. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art.
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Diplomatic necessity might also expand the competence of
the EEA. Conceivably, EC environmental policies would preempt
the negotiation of environmental treaties by Member States. To
date, this has not happened. 77 The EEC Treaty states that "[t]he
previous paragraph shall be without prejudice to Member States'
competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude
international agreements. ' 78 The Treaty also provides: "The pro-
tective measures adopted in common pursuant to Article 130s shall
not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing
more stringent protective measures compatible with this Treaty. '79
Purely national policy cannot solve contemporary environmental
problems; an ever-growing number of international agreements
struggle with environmental issues. In addition to bilateral and
multilateral agreements between states, supranational organiza-
tions play an expanding role in the search for global solutions.
From the perspective of nations outside the EC, negotiation with
the EC is more efficient than parallel bilateral negotiations with
individual Member States. Moreover, the EC is increasingly con-
sidered the paramount locus of power in West Europe, more im-
portant than any of its Member States. In the global context of
environmental concerns, the supranational politics of the EC will
gradually supplant the diplomacy of Member States.
As environmental and developmental issues become increas-
ingly linked, the position of the industrialized nations will become
168a. Such a fanciful reading would be merely amusing, save for the problem posed by
poisonous, bankrupt, yet economically crucial industrial sites in East Europe.
77. For instance, individual Member States and the EC are signatories to the Mon-
treal Protocol.
78. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 130r, para. 5.
79. Id. art. 130t. In the context of fishing rights, individual Member States are
precluded from conducting negotiations on fishing rights with non-Member States. See
Churchill, Revision of the EEC's Common Fisheries Policy-Part II, 5 EUR. L. REV. 95(1980); Koers, The External Authority of the EEC in Regard to Marine Fisheries, 14 CoMM.
MKT. L. REv. 269, 279-80 (1977). A grant of fishing rights by a non-EC State to a Member
State gives a competitive advantage to the citizens of the Member State vis-a-vis the
fisherfolk of other Member States. Moreover, the existence of the bilateral agreement
narrows the scope of negotiation available to the EC. Consequently, the EC could not
maintain a consistent internal or external fishing policy, and the bilateral negotiations would
be in conflict with the EEC Treaty, which ensures that Member States take "all appropriate
measures" to fulfill their Treaty obligations. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5. While there
are obvious differences between pollution control and an extractive enterprise like fishing,
the analogy between the negotiation of fishing agreements and environmental agreements,
or commercial agreements with environmental aspects, bears thought. Particularly in re-
lations with East Europe and developing nations, pollution control is likely to become a
bargaining chip similar to fishing rights. Moreover, for reasons suggested below, the con-
sistency of EC environmental policy is likely to become increasingly important.
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more and more politicized. The effectiveness of the European
negotiating position will largely depend on the consistency of Eu-
ropean environmental policy. The diplomatic requirement of con-
sistent environmental policy will tend to shift regulation from the
national to the Community level. Global politics, as well as suf-
fering in the European environment, will compel the EC to adopt
an aggressive approach toward environmental problems, which
can only mean the EEA will grow. 0
80. As a matter of political reality, the legal entity known as the EEA may not grow.
The regulatory role this Note envisions for the EEA might be filled by another organization,
perhaps DG XI, but nomenclature is of secondary importance. If present circumstances
are any guide, the EC will become far more involved in management of the environment
than ever before.
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